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Abstract
This paper analyzes the long-term development of competitive balance in
a professional team sports league with win-maximizing clubs facing a strict
break-even constraint as imposed by UEFA’s new Financial Fair Play Regu-
lations. A classical model of professional team sports leagues is employed to
calculate seasonal competitive balance, which solely depends on the market
size of clubs. In the multi-period version of the model, a market size function,
which captures the empirical fact that a club’s revenue potential is positively
affected by its historic success, is introduced. The model shows that there is
only one long-term steady-state equilibrium, in which big clubs totally domi-
nate small clubs and competitive balance is maximally uneven. The intuition
is that a club, which becomes more successful, is able to attract more and
more spectators yielding higher revenue and leading to the club being able
to afford more playing talent. This in turn leads to greater success, which
in turn attracts even more spectators and so forth. Since small clubs are no
longer allowed to overspend and thereby invest their way to a greater market
size in the future, the model predicts a negative trend in competitive balance
to be the result of the new UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations.
Keywords: Sports Economics, Professional Team Sports, Competitive
Balance, UEFA Financial Fair Play
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1. Introduction
In recent years, many teams from professional European football leagues
have suffered severe financial losses. Some teams, most notably perhaps
Chelsea FC and Manchester City in England, have been taken over by very
wealthy new owners, who spent huge amounts of private money to strengthen
their teams. This subsequently led other teams to overspend on their budgets
in order to compete for the best players in the market.
To stop this rat race and to guarantee the long-term financial survival of
the clubs, Europe’s football governing body UEFA decided to introduce the
so called Financial Fair Play Regulations, which forces clubs to live within
their means. As of 2015, clubs have to break-even over a three years period
or face exclusion from UEFA’s prestigious international competitions, the
UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the long-term consequences on com-
petitive balance caused by the introduction of a strict break-even constraint.
In section 2, a classical model of professional team sports leagues is employed
to calculate seasonal winning percentages of clubs. Competitive balance in
such a model is typically solely dependent on the market size of clubs, a
variable summarizing a club’s revenue potential.
In section 3, the single-period model is adapted to a multi-period frame-
work that introduces a market size function, which accounts for the empirical
fact that a club’s revenue potential is positively dependent on its historical
success (the glory hunter phenomenon).1 If a club becomes more successful,
it is able to attract more and more spectators, which increases market size
and guarantees even greater success in the future. The model predicts that
there is only one long-term steady-state equilibrium of competitive balance,
in which big clubs totally dominate small clubs and competitive balance is
maximally uneven. Section 4 concludes.
1For example, German clubs 1.FC Kaiserslautern and Borussia Mo¨nchengladbach orig-
inate from rather small towns/metropolitan areas, but today have many supporters and
thus a high market size, presumably because of the clubs’ historical success in the 1950s
and 1970s respectively.
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2. The single-period model
This chapter replicates the basic framework of common single-period team
sports models, which will later be adapted to the multi-period model. Typi-
cally a league with only two clubs (i = 1, 2) is considered (see, e.g., Quirk and
Fort 1992, Vrooman 1995, Szymanski 2004, Kesenne 2006). The clubs differ
with respect to their potential revenue from selling match tickets, merchan-
dise, and broadcasting rights as well as sponsorships, which are indicated
by a club’s market size mi. In the single-period model the market size is
assumed to be exogenous and cannot be influenced by the club. Revenue
is also affected by a club’s winning percentage wi, which has a positive but
decreasing marginal effect up until a certain level of success at which the club
becomes too dominant to keep spectators interested in the competition and
revenue begins to decline (uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, (Rottenberg
1956)). In the following concave revenue function Ri, the preference for the
uncertainty of outcome is reflected by β, with 1 ≤ β ≤ 2:
Ri (wi,mi, β) = miwi − mi
β
w2i (1)
such that
∂Ri
∂wi
> 0 for wi <
β
2
∂Ri
∂wi
= 0 for wi =
β
2
∂Ri
∂wi
< 0 for wi >
β
2
(2)
Perfectly divisible units of playing talent are available to the clubs on the
professional players labor market at constant marginal costs of c > 0 (flexible
talent supply, see, e.g., Szymanski 2004). A team’s winning percentage de-
pends both on the number of own playing talents Ti and also on the number
of playing talents Tj of the competing club. The following simple Tullock
contest success function is assumed:
wi =
Ti
Ti + Tj
(3)
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Clubs choose their number of playing talents under the assumption of win-
maximizing behavior and subject to a seasonal budget constraint that does
not allow for losses:
max
Ti
wi s.t. Ri − cTi = 0 (4)
Since the acquisition of an additional unit of playing talent causes an ex-
ternal effect on the competing club’s winning percentage, the two clubs find
themselves in a strategic rent seeking game. Rewriting (4) yields the clubs’
reaction functions:
Ti =
−mi
β
+mi − 2cTj +
√(
mi − miβ
)2
+
4cmiTj
β
2c
(5)
Figure 1: Reaction functions and competitive balance in Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is found graphically at the intersection of the two
reaction functions (see Figure 1). The ratio of the amount of talent units
4
hired by the clubs in equilibrium measures competitive balance, which is
solely dependent on market size.
Since in equilibrium both clubs spend as much money as possible on play-
ing talent without generating losses, the budget constraints in (4) strictly
hold for both clubs and thus club i’s winning percentage can easily be calcu-
lated:
mi − mi
β
w∗i = mj −
mj
β
(1− w∗i ) ⇔ w∗i =
β (mi −mj) +mj
mi +mj
(6)
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that mi +mj = 1. In order to have
winning percentages ranging between 0 and 1, the following conditions must
hold:
β − 1
2β − 1 ≤ mi ≤
β
2β − 1 (7)
Since 1 ≤ β ≤ 2 and mi +mj = 1, 1/3 ≤ mi ≤ 2/3 is sufficient to guarantee
a valid solution with respect to the winning percentages regardless of β.
Therefore, let mmaxi = 2/3 and m
min
i = 1/3 denote the maximal and minimal
market sizes required for the model to work. If the two clubs are assumed to
originate from equally big cities and market size is interpreted as the share
of inhabitants interested in their local club, mmini represents the amount of
unconditionally loyal supporters, who never lose interest in their team, while
mmaxi represents the greatest amount of people that could become interested
in the club. It follows that wmaxi = (β + 1)/3 and w
min
i = (2− β)/3.
The model is set up such that the club operating in the bigger market
can generate a higher revenue than the smaller club at any given level of
winning percentage and can subsequently afford more talent units and thus
outperforms the small market team on the playing field. In this sense, the
model is well-behaved and does not allow for the rather implausible outcome
of the smaller club dominating the bigger club, which cannot be ruled out if
no additional assumptions are made on the clubs’ revenue function beyond
concavity and club owners’ objectives (see Fort and Quirk 2004, Kesenne
2006).
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3. The multi-period model
The theoretical framework from the previous section is now adapted to
model the long-term development of competitive balance in professional team
sports leagues. An infinite time horizon and a discrete time scale is assumed,
with each period representing a single league season. Clubs again only dif-
fer with respect to market size, but market size is no longer exogenous but
instead assumed to be positively dependent on a club’s historical success.
This idea is motivated by what is known as the infamous glory hunter phe-
nomenon amongst sports fans: clubs enjoying a spell of increasing success
attract spectators who previously had no strong connection to the club but
are now keen to associate themselves with a winning team. Obviously this
effect also works in the opposite direction, so if a club’s success declines, the
glory hunters jump ship and market size decreases.
To model the endogeneity of market size, a recursive symmetric market
size function is considered, which simply assumes market size of club i in
season t to be dependent on winning percentage in season t− 1:
mti = m
t
i(w
t−1
i ) with mi +mj = 1 (8)
Club i’s revenue R in season t is then given by:
Rti[w
t
i ,m
t
i(w
t−1
i ), β] = m
t
i(w
t−1
i )w
t
i −
mti(w
t−1
i )
β
wt2i (9)
The characteristics of the revenue function (9) with respect to the critical
level of success that triggers decreasing seasonal revenue are the same as
those of the single-period model’s revenue function. In each season perfectly
divisible units of playing talent are available on the players labor market at
constant marginal costs c > 0. Units of talent hired in a previous period
do not persist into the next period, thus a club is not constrained in its
decision on the amount of talent units in season t other than through its
budget. In each period, clubs are assumed to maximize winning percentage
under a seasonal break-even constraint as imposed by new UEFA Financial
Fair Play Regulations. Note that under these regulations, clubs cannot use
savings from previous seasons to balance out an operating loss in a later
season without infringing the break-even constraint. Thus for clubs maxi-
mizing winning percentage it is a strictly dominant strategy to break even
by spending their entire seasonal revenue on player salaries. It follows that
winning percentages in equilibrium in season t are calculated in the same
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way that winning percentages were calculated in the single-period model (6)
and competitive balance is solely dependent on market sizes in t:
wt∗i =
β
(
mti −mtj
)
+mtj
mti +m
t
j
(10)
Assume now a market size function with the following properties:
mti = m
min
i for w
t−1
i ≤ wmini
mti = m
max
i for w
t−1
i ≥ wmaxi
dmti
dwt−1i
> 0 for wmini < w
t−1
i < w
max
i
d2mti
dwt−1i
2 > 0 for w
min
i < w
t−1
i < 1/2
d2mti
dwt−1i
2 = 0 for w
t−1
i = 1/2
d2mti
dwt−1i
2 < 0 for 1/2 < w
t−1
i < w
max
i
(11)
In order to get valid equilibrium solutions, market size at any point in time
should neither exceed mmaxi nor fall below m
min
i . For convenience it is as-
sumed that mti = m
min
i for w
t−1
i ≤ wmini and mti = mmaxi for wt−1i ≥ wmaxi .
Between wmini and w
max
i market size monotonically increases. For 1/2 <
wt−1i < w
max
i the market size function is concave, so the marginal effect on
market size decreases as it becomes increasingly difficult for the club to at-
tract new spectators. From symmetry it follows that mti(
1
2
) = 1
2
. Figure 2
illustrates the aforementioned properties of the market size function.
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Figure 2: Properties of the market size function
There are two possible long-term equilibria:
w∗1 = w
∗
2 = m
∗
1 = m
∗
2 = 1/2 (12)
and
w∗1 = w
max
i ;m
∗
1 = m
max
i
w∗2 = w
min
i ,m
∗
2 = m
min
i
(13)
From mti(
1
2
) = 1
2
it follows that (12) represents a long-term equilibrium.
Without any external shock to either winning percentage or market sizes,
both clubs will forever be locked in a perfectly balanced competition. This
equilibrium is not stable though. Any shock to either market size or winning
percentage will start a convergence that leads to the steady-state equilib-
rium represented by (13). The intuition behind this is rather simple. A
club becoming more successful in t will attract more spectators in t+ 1 and
therefore enjoy a greater market size in t+1. This yields an increase in club
revenue, allowing the club to afford more talent units, which in turn will
lead to a higher winning percentage in t+ 1 than previously in t, increasing
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market size even further in t+2 and so forth. The growth of the market size
slows down over time until the steady-state equilibrium in (13) is reached.
The model predicts that big clubs will become bigger and bigger over time,
totally dominating smaller clubs in the long-term equilibrium, in which com-
petitive balance is maximally uneven. Figure 3 illustrates the development
of market sizes and winning percentages over time.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact on winning percentages and market sizes
through a sudden break-in of the bigger club’s winning percentages during
the convergence to the long-term steady-state equilibrium. In the short-term,
this shock leads to a period of lesser success on the playing field, but in the
long-term the club will exceeds its previous market size and enjoy greater
success.
Figure 3: Market sizes and winning percentages in the long run
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Figure 4: External shock to club 1’s winning percentage
4. Conclusion
The object of this paper was to analyze the long-term consequences on
competitive balance in a professional team sports league with win-maximizing
clubs, that follow from the introduction of a strict break-even constraint as
intended by UEFA’s new Financial Fair Play Regulations.
The model presented accounts for the empirical fact, that a club’s revenue
potential or market size is positively dependent on its historical success,
caused by the glory hunter phenomenon: If a club becomes more successful,
it is able to attract more and more spectators, which increases the club’s
market size and future success, which in turn increases market size even
further.
Since under the break-even constraint small clubs cannot overspend or
invest in a greater market size for the future, they are unable to stop this
process and a maximally uneven competitive balance in the long run, where
big clubs totally dominate small clubs, is the resulting outcome.
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